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ciliation of two high values--conceding to each state the responsibility for working out the quality of its justice, while yet
assuring to the individual at least the essentials of fair treatment, albeit not the particular guaranties enumerated in Amendments One to Eight.
The reviewer closed the book with the thought that, interesting and important as are all of the comments, the most significant reflection is suggested rather than expressed in the text.
Every position is advanced accurately and defended with effective strokes-one recalls the author's strength when an advocate
at the bar. The present state of constitutional development is
marked, sometimes with a certain note of resignation but never
with the accent of despair. There have throughout our history
been patriots whose attachment to their own opinions was more
assured than their faith in the American nation. Justice Roberts
is not of their number. He is never one to spread alarm even
though at some points his views may not prevail. One knows
that, like the justice to whose memory the lectures did honor,
Justice Roberts has faith that the future may be greater than
the thought of even the wisest of patriots.
Charles Fairman*.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, by Joel
Francis Paschal. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951.
Pp. xii, 267. $4.00.
As the author, himself, recognizes, this is not conventional
biography. Indeed, it is scarcely biography at all. No clear-cut
picture of Mr. Justice Sutherland as an individual human being
emerges from these pages. Information with reference even to
the basic milestones of his career is sparingly offered. Mr. Paschal,
rather, has devoted himself to the study of the acquisition and
application by Sutherland of a theory of government. Within
these limitations-and perhaps, in part, because of them-the
author has produced a valuable, if not particularly engaging,
work.
It is Mr. Paschal's thesis that Sutherland, largely as a result
of his formal education under men like Cooley and Campbell at
the Michigan Law School and his early professional associations
at the bar, was profoundly influenced in his intellectual develop* Professor of Law and Political Science, Stanford University.
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ment by the speculations of Herbert Spencer. The Spencerian
creed in its social and political applications was founded on the
proposition that the maximum of human happiness results in that
situation in which individuals have achieved a successful aclaptation to their environment. This adaptation can be fully accomplished only where the greatest individual freedom of action is
permitted. Governmental intervention, since it interferes with
the operation of natural evolutionary forces, was, therefore, to
be viewed with suspicion and hostility. Mr. Paschal's thesis, of
course, leaves certain important questions unanswered. Many
members of Sutherland's generation were subjected to the impact
of Spencerian thought; yet there were those who eventually
escaped its thralldom. Why Sutherland was not one of these is
not fully explained. Perhaps it is a question of the sort which
can never be completely answered.
In any event, except for a brief and rather chaste flirtation
with reform during the Progressive Era, Sutherland adhered with
remarkable consistency to his Spencerian assumptions. Nor did
he permit himself to doubt that those were the assumptions upon
which the American constitutional system is based. Unfortunately for the permanence of Sutherland's contribution, they are
assumptions that have not withstood the ravages of time. In the
whole history of thought there has probably been no more rapid
eclipse of a widely-held philosophical system than that of Herbert
Spencer. In a recently-published history of western philosophy
written by a compatriot of Spencer, the latter's name is not so
much as listed in the index.' Perhaps the most serious deficiency
in the Spencerian system, as Mr. Paschal rightly points out, was
that it provided no mechanism by which theory could be adjusted
to the underlying social facts. It was Sutherland's fate to attempt
application of the Spencerian formula throughout a period when
those facts were in rapid flux. Eventually the discrepancy between theory and fact became intolerable; and the constitutional
point of view which has come to be associated with Sutherland's
name was at least temporarily overthrown.
This is not to say that much of Sutherland's work has not
2
survived the deluge. His opinion in Massachusetts v. Me~lon still
serves as the foundation for broad exercise of the federal spending powers. Ironically enough, those powers have been employed
1. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945).
2. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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to produce governmental intervention of the sort which Sutherland undoubtedly disapproved. His opinion in Powell v. Alabama,3 dealing with the problem of federal judicial supervision
of state criminal procedures, may be regarded as the starting
point of one of the most significant modern developments of
constitutional doctrine. Finally, Sutherland's views as to the
power of the federal government in the area of4foreign relations
have received no serious challenge in the court.
Because he did not clearly understand that in the modern
society, individual freedom may be lost through the exercise
of unrestrained power by private groups as well as through
encroachments by government, Sutherland often misconceived
the nature of the problem of liberty. Yet his sincere dedication to
the cause of liberty cannot be doubted. And those who question
the relevance of much of Sutherland's thought in reconciling the
current insistent demands of liberty and authority have not themselves achieved such conspicuous success as to justify complacent
scorn of Sutherland's efforts in behalf of individual freedom.
The author's analysis is skillfully developed and temperately
presented. Certainly, something is lost in the failure of the book
to scrutinize the whole man. Yet there are compensations; and
it may be that the work produces an increased impact by confining its attention to the intellectual world of Mr. Justice Sutherland. The book represents a worthy contribution to the literature of the court.
Francis A. Allen*
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

